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[Costcos] management is focused on ... employees to the detriment of shareholders. To
me, why would I want to buy a stock like that?Equity analyst, quoted in BusinessWeek
I happen to believe that in order to reward the shareholder in the long term, you have to
please your customers and workers.Jim Sinegal, Costcos CEO, quoted in the Wall Street
Journal
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the relationship between employee satisfaction and long-run stock returns.
A value-weighted portfolio of the 100 Best Companies to Work For in America earned a
four-factor alpha of 0.29% per month from 1984-2009, or 3.5% per year. These gures exclude
any event-study reaction to list inclusion and capture only long-run drift. When compared to
industry-matched benchmarks, the alpha remains a statistically signicant 2.1%. The results
are also robust to controlling for rm characteristics, di¤erent weighting methodologies, and
adjusting for outliers. The outperformance is at least as strong from 1998, even though the
list was published in Fortune magazine and thus highly visible to investors. The Best Compa-
nies (BCs) exhibit signicantly more positive earnings surprises and stock price reactions to
earnings announcements: over the four announcement dates in each year, they earn 1.2-1.7%
more than peer rms. These ndings contribute to three strands of research: the increasing
importance of human capital in the modern corporation; the equity markets failure to fully in-
corporate the value of intangible assets; and the e¤ect of socially responsible investing (SRI)
screens on investment performance.
Existing theories yield conicting predictions as to whether employee satisfaction is bene-
cial for rm value. Traditional theories (e.g. Taylor, 1911) are based on the capital-intensive
rm of the early 20th century, which focused on cost e¢ ciency. Employees perform unskilled
tasks and have no special status just like other inputs such as raw materials, managements
goal is to extract maximum output while minimizing their cost. Satisfaction arises if employees
are overpaid or underworked, both of which reduce rm value.1 Principal-agent theory also
supports this zero-sum view: the rms objective function is maximized by holding the worker
to her reservation wage. In contrast, more recent theories argue that the role of employees has
dramatically changed over the past century. The current environment emphasizes quality and
innovation, for which human, rather than physical capital, is particularly important (Zingales,
2000). Human relations theories (e.g. Maslow, 1943; Hertzberg, 1959; McGregor, 1960) view
employees as key organizational assets, rather than expendable commodities, who can create
substantial value by inventing new products or building client relationships. These theories
argue that satisfaction can improve retention and motivation, to the benet of shareholders.
1Indeed, agency problems may lead to managers tolerating insu¢ cient e¤ort and/or excessive pay, at share-
holdersexpense. The manager may derive private benets from improving his colleaguescompensation, such
as more pleasant working relationships (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Alternatively, high wages may constitute
a takeover defense (Pagano and Volpin (2005)). Cronqvist et al. (2008) nd that salaries are higher when
managers are more entrenched, which supports the view that high worker pay is ine¢ cient.
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Which theory is borne out in reality is an important question for both managers and in-
vestors, and provides the rst motivation for this paper. If the traditional view still holds
today, managers should minimize expenditure on worker benets, and investors should avoid
rms that fail to do so. In contrast to this view, and the existing evidence reviewed in Section
2.1, I nd a strong, robust, positive correlation between satisfaction and shareholder returns.
This result provides empirical support for recent theories of the rm focused on employees as
the key assets, e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998), Carlin and Gervais (2009), and Berk, Stanton,
and Zechner (2010).
I study long-run stock returns for three main reasons. First, they su¤er fewer reverse causal-
ity issues than valuation ratios or prots. A positive correlation between valuation/prots and
satisfaction could occur if performance causes satisfaction, but a well-performing rm should
not exhibit superior future returns as prots should already be in the current stock price, since
they are tangible.2 Second, they are more directly linked to shareholder value than prots,
capturing all the channels through which satisfaction may benet shareholders and represent-
ing the returns they actually receive. In addition to prots, satisfaction may lead to many
other tangible outcomes valued by the market, such as new products or contracts. Studying
returns also allows for controls for risk.3 Third, valuation ratios or event-study returns may
substantially underestimate any relationship, given ample previous evidence that the market
fails to fully incorporate intangibles. Firms with high R&D (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan,
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), advertising (Chan et al., 2001), patent citations (Deng,
Lev, and Narin, 1999) and software development costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998) all earn supe-
rior long-run returns. The market may be even more likely to undervalue employee satisfaction
since theory has ambiguous predictions for whether it is desirable for rm value.
Indeed, investigating the markets incorporation of satisfaction is my second goal. I aim not
only to extend earlier results to another category of intangibles, but also to shed light on the
causes of the non-incorporation documented previously. The main explanation for prior results
is that intangibles are not incorporated because the market lacks information on their value
(the lack-of-information hypothesis). While R&D spending can be observed in an income
statement, this is an input measure uninformative of its quality or success (Lev, 2004.) Even if
information is available on an output measure such as patent citations, the market may ignore
it if it is not salient (Deng et al.s citation measure had to be hand-constructed) or about small
rms which are not widely followed (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000).
This paper evaluates the above hypothesis by using a quite di¤erent measure of intangibles to
prior research, which addresses investorslack of information. The BC list measures satisfaction
(an output) rather than expenditure on employee-friendly programs (an input). It is also
particularly visible: from 1998 it has been widely disseminated by Fortune, and it covers large
2Faleye and Trahan (2006) nd that the BCs exhibit superior contemporaneous accounting performance than
peers over 1998-2004. Lau and May (1998) nd a similar link using the 1993 list, but Fulmer, Gerhart and Scott
(2003) nd no relationship. Filbeck and Preece (2003) show that rms in the 1998 list exhibited higher returns
prior to list inclusion. Simon and DeVaro (2006) show that the BCs exhibit higher customer satisfaction. These
results are consistent with reverse causality from performance to satisfaction, and do not have implications for
the markets valuation of intangibles or the protability of an SRI trading strategy.
3Goenner (2008) controls for the market beta but not other factors or characteristics.
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companies (median market value of $5bn in 1998). Moreover, it is released on a specic event
date which attracts widespread attention, because it discloses information on several companies
simultaneously.4 If lack of information is the primary reason for previous non-incorporation
ndings, there should be no excess returns to the BC list.
My analysis is a joint test of satisfaction both beneting rm value and not being fully valued
by the market. By delaying portfolio formation until the month after list publication, I give the
market ample opportunity to react to its content. Yet, I still nd signicant outperformance.
This result suggests that the non-incorporation of intangibles found by prior research does
not stem purely from lack of information, but other factors. Even if investors were aware of
rmslevels of satisfaction, they may have been unaware of its benets, since theory provides
ambiguous predictions. An alternative explanation is that investors use traditional valuation
methodologies, devised for the 20th century rm and based on physical assets, which cannot
incorporate intangibles easily. The results also support managerial myopia theories (e.g. Stein,
1988; Edmans, 2009), in which managers underinvest in intangible assets because they are
invisible to outsiders and thus do not improve the stock price. Even if managers are able to
provide information on the value of their intangibles (e.g. by hiring independent rms to audit
their value), the market may not capitalize them.
In addition to the valuation of intangibles, the paper contributes to the broader literature
on market underreaction since the Fortune study has a clearly-dened release date, in contrast
to previous intangible measures. Prior research nds that underreaction is strongest for small
rms (e.g. Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000); more generally, Fama and French (2008) nd that most
anomalies are conned to small stocks and thus hard to exploit given their high transactions
costs. Here, underreaction occurs even though most rms in the BC list are large, and so the
mispricing is exploitable.
The third implication relates to the protability of SRI strategies, whereby investors only
select companies that have a positive impact on stakeholders other than shareholders. Em-
ployee welfare is an SRI screen used by a number of funds. Traditional portfolio theory (e.g.
Markowitz, 1959) suggests that any SRI screen reduces returns, since it restricts an investors
choice set mathematically, a constrained optimization is never better than an unconstrained
optimization. Indeed, many existing studies nd a zero (Hamilton, Jo and Statman, 1993;
Kurtz and DiBartolomeo, 1996; Guerard, 1997; Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten, 2005; Schröder,
2007; Statman and Glushkov, 2008) or negative (Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin, 2005; Bram-
mer, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2006; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk,
2009) e¤ect of SRI screens. While Moskowitz (1972), Luck and Pilotte (1993) and Derwall et al.
(2005) nd certain SRI screens improve returns, these results are based on short time periods.
The Markowitz (1959) argument suggests that any SRI screen worsens performance, and
so it is su¢ cient to uncover one screen that improves performance to contradict it. I study
a screen based on employee satisfaction as there is a strong theoretical motivation for why it
4By contrast, R&D is one of many measures reported in a companys earnings announcement, and such
announcements occur at di¤erent times for di¤erent rms. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Yermack (2006)
and Liu and Yermack (2007) also document long-run abnormal returns. Their measures of corporate governance,
corporate jets and CEO mansions are also not released on a specic date and widely disseminated.
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may exhibit a positive correlation with stock returns (see Section 2). Indeed, I nd an SRI
screen that can improve returns. If an investor is aware of every asset in the economy, an
SRI screen can never help, as non-SRI investors are free to choose the screened stocks anyway.
However, if she can only learn about a subset of the available universe due to time constraints
(as in Merton, 1987), the SRI screen rather than excluding good investments may focus
the choice set on good investments. A rms concern for other stakeholders, such as employees,
may ultimately benet shareholders (the rst implication of the paper), yet not be priced by
the market as stakeholder capitalis intangible (the second implication).
There are several potential explanations for the positive returns found in this paper. One is
mispricing: high satisfaction causes higher rm value, as predicted by human capital theories,
but the market fails to capitalize it immediately. Indeed, both the magnitude and duration of
the excess returns are similar to or lower than found by analyses of long-run returns to other
intangibles, rm characteristics or corporate events. Thus, the mispricing implied by this expla-
nation is within the bounds of what prior literature has found to be feasible. Under a mispricing
channel, an intangible only a¤ects the stock price when it subsequently manifests in tangible out-
comes that are valued by the market. I indeed nd that the BCs have signicantly more positive
earnings surprises than peer rmsand greater abnormal returns to earnings announcements. A
mispricing story also implies that the BCsoutperformance might not be permanent, for two
reasons. First, some rms are only on the list for a nite period: employee satisfaction may
vary with changes in management or a rms human resource policy (perhaps as a result of
nancial constraints). Thus the level of intangibles and hence mispricing fall over time. Second,
even for rms for which satisfaction is reasonably permanent, the market may learn about its
true value over time as it releases positive tangible news. Consistent with both channels, I
nd the drift to list inclusion declines over time and becomes insignicant in the fth year.
In contrast, prior studies of M&A (Agrawal, Ja¤e, and Mandelker, 1992; Loughran and Vijh,
1997), value strategies (Lakonsihok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) and equity issuance (Spiess
and A­ eck-Graves, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) nd no evidence of returns declining in
the fth year, and so the above explanation requires less mispricing than these earlier ndings.
Consistent with the second channel in particular, the returns sharply decline in the fth year
even for rms that remain on the list for all ve years. Consistent with the rst channel in
particular, buying stocks dropped from the BC list or not updating the portfolio for future lists
leads to lower returns than holding the most current list.
An alternative causal interpretation is that superior returns are caused not by employee
satisfaction, but list inclusion per se it encourages SRI funds to buy the BCs, and this demand
caused their prices to rise. I nd that SRI funds that use labor or employment screens increased
their weighting on the BCs over time, but this e¤ect can explain at most 0.02% of the annual
outperformance. Moreover, as with other long-run event studies (e.g. Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003; Yermack, 2006; Liu and Yermack, 2007), we do not have a natural experiment
with random assignment of the variable of interest to rms, and so the data admit non-causal
explanations. First, the use of long-run stock returns only reduces, rather than eliminates,
reverse causality concerns. While publicly observed prots should already be in the current
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stock price, reverse causality can occur in the presence of private information employees with
favorable information report higher satisfaction today, and the market is unaware that the list
conveys such information. This explanation is unlikely given the 7-month time lag between
responding to the BC survey and the start of the return compounding window; in addition,
existing studies suggest that workers have no superior information on their rms future returns
(e.g. Benartzi, 2001; Bergman and Jenter, 2007). Second, satisfaction may proxy for other
variables that are positively linked to stock returns and also misvalued by the market. While I
control for an extensive set of observable characteristics and covariances, by their very nature
unobservables (such as good management) cannot be directly controlled for. If either reverse
causality or omitted variables account for the bulk of the results, improving employee welfare
may not cause increases in shareholder value. However, the second and third conclusions of
the paper still remain: the existence of a protable SRI trading strategy on large rms, and
the markets failure to incorporate the contents of a highly visible measure of intangibles 
regardless of whether the list captures satisfaction, management or employee condence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical motivation for hypoth-
esizing a link between employee satisfaction and stock returns. Section 3 discusses the data and
methodology and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the possible explanations
for the ndings and Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Motivation: Why Might Employee Satis-
faction Lead to Excess Returns?
For employee satisfaction to lead to superior returns, this requires that employee satisfaction is
both benecial for rm value and not immediately capitalized by the market. Sections 2.1 and
2.2 provide the motivation for each hypothesis.
2.1. Employee Satisfaction and Firm Value
It may seem intuitive that employee satisfaction should improve rm performance, perhaps even
removing the need to demonstrate such a relationship empirically. However, the traditional the-
ories reviewed in the introduction suggest the opposite relationship, and existing evidence nds
little support for the human relations view. Abowd (1989) shows that announcements of pay
increases reduce market valuations dollar-for-dollar; Diltz (1995) nds stock returns are un-
correlated with the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) minority management and women
in management variables, and negatively correlated with family benets; Dhrymes (1998) nd
no relationship with KLDs employee relations variable; and Gorton and Schmid (2004) show
that greater employee involvement reduces protability and valuation. On the one hand, such
research renders the relationship non-obvious, and thus interesting to study. On the other
hand, it is necessary to have a convincing a priori hypothesis for why a positive link might
exist in spite of the above research, to mitigate data-miningconcerns and the risk that any
correlation is spurious rather than reecting a true economic relationship.
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Human relations theories argue that satisfaction may benet shareholders through two mech-
anisms. The rst is motivation. In traditional manufacturing rms, motivation was simple
because workersoutput could be easily measured, allowing the use of monetary piece rates
(Taylor, 1911). In the modern rm, workerstasks are increasingly di¢ cult to quantify, such
as building client relationships. Output-based incentives may thus be ine¤ective or even de-
structive (Kohn, 1993). The reduced e¤ectiveness of extrinsic motivators increases the role for
intrinsic motivators such as satisfaction. This role is microfounded in both economics and soci-
ology. The e¢ ciency wage theory of Akerlof and Yellen (1986) argues that excesssatisfaction
can increase e¤ort, because the worker wishes to avoid being red from a satisfying job (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984) or views it as a giftfrom the rm and responds with a giftof increased
e¤ort (Akerlof, 1982). Sociological theories argue that satised employees identify with the
rm and internalize its objectives, thus inducing e¤ort (McGregor, 1960). A second channel
is retention. In the traditional rm, retention was unimportant as employees performed un-
skilled tasks. In contrast, they are the key source of value creation in modern knowledge-based
industries, such as pharmaceuticals or software. Relatedly, high satisfaction can be a valuable
recruitment tool.5 A quite separate benet to those predicted by human relations theories is
that customers may be more willing to patronize rms which treat their workers fairly for
example, Whole Foods actively advertises its list inclusion to customers.
2.2. Underpricing of Employee Satisfaction
In an e¢ cient market, a tangible variable that is unambiguously benecial to rm value will be
rapidly capitalized and not lead to excess returns. However, a broad strand of existing research
documents underpricing of a number of rm characteristics. Starting with studies of intangibles
in particular, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) nd a 4.6% abnormal return based on R&D capital,
and Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) show that rms in the top quintile of R&D ows
earn excess returns of 6.1%. Advertising (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), patent
citations (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999) and software developments (Aboody and Lev, 1998) are
also associated with excess returns. Moving to other variables, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) nd 8.5% abnormal returns to a governance portfolio, Yermack (2006) documents a
negative 3.8% alpha to rms in which the CEO uses a corporate jet, Liu and Yermack (2007)
show 13.8% returns to a portfolio formed on CEO homes, and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)
nd a 3.2% alpha to sin stocks.
This paper is also related to studies of long-run drift, since the BC list has a clearly-dened
release date. Numerous studies nd large and persistent drift after a variety of corporate
5These theories imply a high level of compensation, but do not suggest that the form of compensation should
be in satisfaction compared to cash. Indeed, in the early 20th century, cash was viewed as the most e¤ective
motivator: given harsh economic conditions, workers were mainly concerned with physical needs such as food
and shelter, which could be addressed with money. Such a view would motivate a study of wages rather than
satisfaction. Again, human relations theories stress that the world is di¤erent nowadays. Maslow (1943) and
Hertzberg (1959) argue that money is only an e¤ective motivator up to a point: once workersphysical needs are
met, they are motivated by non-pecuniary factors such as job satisfaction, which cannot be externally purchased
with cash and can only be provided by the rm. Hence, satisfaction is an e¢ cient form of compensation.
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events. For M&A, Agrawal, Ja¤e, and Mandelker (1992) nd that acquirers su¤er -10% abnor-
mal returns over the next ve years; Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that cash tender o¤ers
(stock mergers) outperform their benchmarks by 62% (-25%) over a ve-year period. Both nd
that abnormal returns are still strong in the fth year. For IPOs, Ritter (1991) nds under-
performance of 29.1% over three years and that the underperformance is still strong in year
three; Loughran (1993) documents -45% returns over ve years which only die out in year six.
For SEOs, Spiess and A­ eck-Graves (1995) show underperformance of 31-39% over ve years;
Loughran and Ritter (1995) consider IPOs and SEOs together and nd -30% returns over ve
years. Neither nd that returns abate even in year ve. Michaely, Womack, and Thaler (1995)
discover returns to dividend initiations (omissions) of 25% (-15%) over three years and only
evidence of the omission drift declining in the third year. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990)
nd 17% abnormal returns to repurchase tender o¤ers over two years with no evidence of the
returns dying out; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) nd 12% to open-market re-
purchases (45% for value stocks) over four years, with returns only abating in the nal year.
Moving away from event-studies but to other analyses of long-run returns, Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) nd that a value-growth portfolio earns 10% per year and that the returns
are stronger in the fth year than all other years.
In addition to providing evidence for both mispricing and long-horizon drift, existing re-
search also provides guidelines on the magnitude and duration of excess returns that is plau-
sible. Most closely-related are the other intangibles studies which suggest abnormal returns of
up to 4-6% per year are possible. Some of the other studies nd even greater annual excess
returns.6 Moving to the duration of the drift, the studies of M&A, IPOs and SEOs nd no
evidence of abnormal returns abating even in the fth year. Moreover, the bounds of plausi-
bility for the magnitude and longevity of underpricing of employee satisfaction may be even
greater, for two reasons. First, satisfaction is an intangible, while many of the other studies
investigate tangible characteristics and events which are easier to incorporate into traditional
valuation methodologies. Second, theory o¤ers reasonably clear predictions for the direction
of the e¤ect of many previously-studied events on rm value. For example, signaling and free
cash ow theories predict that dividend initiations and repurchases should increase rm value,
and equity issuance and dividend omissions should reduce it; despite these clear predictions,
there is still signicant drift. As previously discussed, traditional theories and existing evidence
suggest that employee satisfaction is negatively correlated with rm value. Thus, even if the
changing nature of the rm suggests the relationship may now be positive, the persistence of
the traditional view may mean the market does not capitalize it.
The majority of the above studies nd long-horizon drift, but do not identify the mechanism.
However, some papers provide evidence that one channel through which rm characteristics
generate superior returns is that they lead to future tangible outcomes that are valued by the
market. La Porta et al. (1997) nd that value stocks exhibit superior earnings surprises to
glamour stocks, and Giroud and Mueller (2010) nd the same for well-governed rms in non-
6The alphas of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Liu and
Yermack (2007) should be halved for comparison with the present setting as they study long-short portfolios.
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competitive industries compared to their worse-governed peers. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)
nd that better-governed rms experience superior returns to M&A announcements.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
My main data source is the list of the 100 Best Companies to Work for in America. This list
was rst published in a book in March 1984 and updated in February 1993. Since 1998, it has
featured in Fortune magazine each January. The list has been headed by Robert Levering and
Milt Moskowitz throughout its 26-year existence. It is compiled from two principal sources.
Two-thirds of the score comes from employee responses to a 57-question survey created by the
Great Place to Work R Institute in San Francisco.7 This survey covers topics such as attitudes
toward management, job satisfaction, fairness, and camaraderie. 250 employees across all levels
are randomly selected in each rm, ll in the surveys anonymously, and return their responses
directly to the Institute. The response rate is around 60%. The remaining one-third of the
score comes from the Institutes evaluation of factors such as a companys demographic makeup,
pay and benets programs, and culture. The companies are scored in four areas: credibility
(communication to employees), respect (opportunities and benets), fairness (compensation,
diversity), and pride/camaraderie (teamwork, philanthropy, celebrations).8 Importantly, For-
tune has no involvement in the company evaluation process, else it may have incentives to bias
the list towards advertisers (Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2006).9
Firms apply to be considered for the list; the application deadline is the previous May and
the questionnaires must be returned by June. Such selection issues either have no e¤ect or
likely bias the results downwards. For it to a¤ect the results, the selection decision must be
correlated with either the independent variable (level of satisfaction) or outcome variable (future
returns). If rms with low satisfaction choose not to apply because they expect not to make
the list, this simply increases its accuracy. If a rm with high satisfaction chooses not to apply
because it believes this quality is already publicly known and thus does not need independent
verication, this reduces the satisfaction level of the rms in the list and attenuates the results.
Turning to the outcome variable, this represents another motivation for studying stock returns
rather than prots. Prots are persistent, and so may be correlated with both the decision
to apply and future prots. In contrast, there should be no correlation between stock returns
at the time of application and during the return window (controlling for momentum). Even if
management has temporary private information on future returns, this likely has little e¤ect
7While the Institute was not founded until 1990, Levering and Moskowitz used the same criteria for the 1984
list, although they surveyed employees directly rather than through a questionnaire.
8After evaluations are completed, if signicant negative news comes to light that may signicantly damage
employeesfaith in management, the Institute may exclude that company from the list. Only news that damages
employee trust is relevant a decline in prots is not an example of such news, unless it has been caused by (say)
unethical behavior. Ever since list commencement, fewer than ve rms have been excluded for this reason.
9Statman, Fisher and Anginer (2008) investigate the returns to another Fortune list, Americas Most
Admired Companies, focusing on the long-term investment value component of this list. This list is not a
measure of employee satisfaction, but investorsviews of the rms and so their interpretation is that it measures
irrational exuberance. Indeed, they nd negative long-horizon returns to rms in this list.
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since list applications must be made by late May and the return window starts the following
February 1 (8 months later). Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2010) show that managersprivate
information is conned to the next 100 days; managers have little predictive ability for returns
over days 100-150. Moreover, if managers have long-lived private information and those who
foresee negative returns are particularly likely to apply (as they believe list inclusion will bolster
their stock price), this will bias the results downwards.
Since 1998, the BC list has been published in the rst issue of Fortune magazine each year.
The publication date is typically in mid-January, and the issue reaches the newsstands one week
before the publication date. If the stock market fully incorporates any e¤ect of satisfaction into
stock prices, the list contents should be impounded by at least the start of February. Therefore,
February 1 is the date for portfolio formation from 1998-2009. The 1984 portfolio is formed on
April 1, and the 1993 portfolio is formed on March 1.
Table 1 details the number of BCs in year t that had stock returns available on CRSP in
at least one month before the next portfolio formation date. The table also gives the number
of rms added to and dropped from the list. As is intuitive, employee satisfaction is a reason-
ably persistent characteristic. However, as with other intangibles (e.g. management quality,
customer satisfaction or product reputation) it is not permanent  approximately one-third
of traded rms drop o¤ the list each year, perhaps as a result of changes in management or
the rms human resource policy (e.g. if it su¤ers nancial constraints.) Over 1984-2009, 244
separate public rms were included in a list, corresponding to 1,616 rm-year observations (810
excluding years when the list was not updated). The number of rms is comparable to similar
abnormal return studies, e.g. 104 in Yermack (2006) and 193 in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009).
On April 1, 1984, I form a portfolio containing the 74 publicly traded BCs in that year, and
measure the returns to this portfolio from April 1984 to February 1993. I construct both equal-
and value-weighted portfolios as Fama and French (2008) nd that a number of anomalies are
not robust to the weighting methodology. The portfolio is reformed on March 1, 1993 to contain
the 65 rms included in the new list, and returns are calculated through January 1998. This
process is repeated until December 2009 and I call this Portfolio I.10 If a BC is initially
private but goes public before the next list, I add it to the portfolio from the rst full month
after it starts trading. 78 rms feature in Portfolio I from 1984-1993, since four rms in the
initial list became public over that period.11
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the original 74 BCs in March 1984, and the 69
BCs in the rst Fortune list in January 1998. Most notably, the rms are large, with a mean
10If a rm de-lists and the delisting payment date is prior to the end of the month, delisting returns are used
where the monthly return is missing. If the delisting payment date is after the end of the month and both
monthly and delisting returns are available, the two are aggregated to calculate the return of the month. At
the start of the next month, the proceeds are reinvested in all of the other stocks in the portfolio, based on
their relative weights in the portfolio at that point in time. Results are unchanged if I instead reinvest any
takeover proceeds in the new parent, under the rationale that at least part of the merged entity exhibits superior
employee satisfaction, or use the Shumway (1997) adjustment to delisting returns.
11The results are unchanged when excluding rms that go public mid-way through the year (to ensure that
IPO underpricing is not driving the results). In addition, I include Best Companies with only ADRs in the U.S.,
since an investor constrained to hold U.S. shares would have been able to invest in such rms. The results are
unchanged when excluding rms with ADRs.
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(median) market value of $4bn ($1bn) in 1984 and $21bn ($5bn) in 1998. As a comparison,
the 80th percentile breakpoint for the Fama-French size portfolios was $1bn in 1984 and $4bn
in 1998. The average market-book ratio is a high 2.4 in 1984 (5.1 in 1998) and the mean ratio
of intangibles to total assets is only 0.9% (5.4%). Together, these results suggest that these
companies have little human capital on the balance sheet, possibly because accounting standards
hinder capitalization, increasing the likelihood that it is not fully valued. The most common
industries in 1984 were consumer goods (7 companies), hardware (7), measuring and control
equipment (5), retail (5), and nancial services (5). In 1998 they were consumer goods (7),
nancial services (6), software (5), pharmaceuticals (5), hardware (4), and electronic equipment
(4). Human capital is plausibly an important input in nearly all of these industries, with the
link perhaps less obvious for consumer goods.
Other measures of employee satisfaction and intangibles have been studied in the litera-
ture, but the use of the Best Companies list is superior for all three goals of the paper. For
the rst goal, studying the e¤ect of satisfaction on rm value is challenging because it is very
di¢ cult to measure. The previously-used measures of CEP and KLD are less informative as
they are only based on observable practices, such as minority representation. They are easier
to manipulate a rm that cares little for employee welfare may hire a minority director to
check the box. Such measurement error may explain the insignicant previous ndings. The
BC list is arguably the most thorough measure available, receiving signicant attention from
shareholders, management, employees, and the media. As outlined above, in addition to con-
sidering observable practices, it involves an in-depth grass-rootsanalysis through extensively
surveying the workers. It is also available for 26 years, whereas other measures exist for shorter
periods and thus the results may lack power or be driven by outliers. (Naturally, studying other
intangibles such as R&D would not assess human capital theories). Second, the BC list is useful
for studying the markets incorporation of intangibles since it is highly public and attracts sub-
stantial attention given its perceived accuracy. It is therefore more salient than not only other
satisfaction measures but also other intangibles studied by prior literature, and allows testing of
the lack-of-informationhypothesis. The list also has a clearly dened release date, allowing
underreaction and drift to be tested. For the papers third goal, the list is publicly available
and easily tradable by an SRI investor. Studying other intangibles would have no implications
for SRI, since intangibles such as R&D and advertising are not SRI screens. In sum, the list
appears unique in being both a thorough measure of employee satisfaction (allowing testing of
human relations theories and SRI) and highly public (allowing testing of the market valuation
of intangibles and returns available to investors).
4. Analysis and Results
To ensure that any outperformance of the BCs does not result from risk, I control for the four
Carhart (1997) factors using Eq. (1) below:
Rt = + MKTMKTt + HMLHMLt + SMBSMBt + MOMMOMt + "it, (1)
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where:
Rit is the return on Portfolio I in month t in excess of a benchmark, described below.
 is an intercept that captures the abnormal risk-adjusted return.
MKTt, HMLt, SMBt andMOMt are the returns on the market, value, size and momentum
factors, taken from Ken Frenchs website.
Standard errors are calculated using Newey-West (1987), which allows for "it to be het-
eroskedastic and serially correlated. The returns Rit are calculated over three di¤erent bench-
marks. The rst is the risk-free rate from Ibbotson Associates. The second is an industry-
matched portfolio using the 49-industry classication of Fama and French (1997). This is to
ensure that outperformance is not simply because the BCs are in industries that happened
to enjoy strong returns.12 It also controls for any industry-specic risks not captured in the
Carhart systematic risk factors. The third is the characteristics-adjusted benchmark used by
Daniel et al. (1997) and Wermers (2004)13, which matches each stock to a portfolio of stocks
with similar size, book-market ratio and momentum. This is to ensure that the outperformance
is not because the BCs are exploiting the size, value and/or momentum anomalies. It is con-
servative, but not necessarily superuous, to subtract the returns on the Daniel et al. (1997)
benchmarks before running the four-factor regression, as characteristics can have explanatory
power even when controlling for covariances (Daniel and Titman, 1997).
4.1. Core Results
Table 3 presents the core results of the paper, for the entire 1984-2009 period. As hypothesized,
Portfolio I generates signicant returns over all benchmarks and for both weighting schemes.
For value-weighted returns, the alpha is 0.29% monthly (3.5% annually) above the risk-free
rate, and 0.17% monthly (2.1% annually) controlling for industries. The returns are slightly
higher when equal-weighting, 0.31% and 0.20% per month, respectively. The magnitude of
the alpha and thus mispricing is within the bounds of plausibility implied by previous studies
that demonstrate abnormal returns, in particular those studying other intangible portfolios, as
summarized in Section 2.2. Moreover, as will be shown in Section 5, a meaningful proportion
the abnormal returns can be explained by earnings surprises.
The outperformance in Table 3 may result from the market being unaware of the BC list
until 1998, since it was only published in book form. Even though the list was still publicly
available and therefore tradable, it was substantially less salient. Therefore, while the full-
sample results are consistent with two of the papers three main implications (the positive
association between satisfaction and stock returns, and the protability of an SRI strategy),
they do not imply that the market ignores highly visible measures of intangibles.
12Note that asset pricing theory does not predict that expected returns should be di¤erent across industries.
I control for industries to be conservative, since it may be that realized returns happened to be higher in
certain industries, e.g. due to a technological shock or change in regulation. I do not take a stance on whether
di¤erential returns across industries stem from risk or mispricing, but control for industries to ensure that it is
not they (rather than satisfaction) that are driving my results.
13The benchmarks are available via http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
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Table 4 therefore repeats the analysis for the 1998-2009 subperiod when the list was featured
in Fortune magazine and thus highly salient. If the mispricing of intangibles, documented by
prior research, stems from lack of information, then the alphas should be insignicant in this
subperiod. In contrast, I nd that the returns are marginally higher, with a value-weighted
monthly alpha of 0.32% over the risk-free rate and 0.19% controlling for industries (0.44% and
0.31% equal-weighted). This result suggests that factors other than the lack of information are
behind the misvaluation of intangibles, such as the di¢ culty in incorporating intangibles into
traditional valuation models. Section 4.4 suggests that the marginally higher returns may stem
from the more frequent list updating in the Fortune subsample.
4.2. Further Robustness Tests
The above subsection showed that the BCsoutperformance was not due to covariance with
the Carhart (1997) factors, nor to their industry a¢ liation or characteristics. This subsection
conducts further robustness tests. To test whether the results are driven by outliers, I winsorize
the x% highest and x% lowest returns exhibited by the BCs over the time period, for x = f5; 10g.
Table 5 show that the alphas for the winsorized portfolios are in fact slightly higher than in
Table 3. The results in the other tables are also robust to winsorization.
An additional concern is that the explanatory power of list inclusion stems from its cor-
relation with rm characteristics other than the size, book-to-market or momentum variables
already studied in Tables 3 and 4. Calculating the returns on a benchmark portfolio with simi-
lar characteristics is only feasible when the number of characteristics is small, else it is di¢ cult
to form a benchmark. I therefore use a regression approach to control for a wider range of
characteristics. Specically, I run a Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of Eq. (2) below:
Rit = a0 + a1Xit + a2Zit + "it; (2)
where:
Rit is the return on stock i in month t, either unadjusted or industry-adjusted.
Xit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if rm i was included in the most recent BC list.
Zit is a vector of rm characteristics.
The Zit controls are taken from Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998). These are
as follows; the Appendix details the calculation of variables that involve Compustat data:
SIZE is the log of is market capitalization at the end of month t  2.
BM is the log of is book-to-market ratio. This variable is recalculated each July and held
constant through the following June.
Y LD is the ratio of dividends in the previous scal year to market value at calendar year-
end. This variable is recalculated each July and held constant through the following June.
RET2-3 is the log of the cumulative return over months t  3 through t  2. RET4-6 and
RET7-12 are dened analogously.
DV OL is the log of the dollar volume of trading in security i in month t  2.
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PRC is the log of is price at the end of month t  2.
Table 6 documents the results. For both adjusted and industry-adjusted returns, list in-
clusion is associated with an additional return of 27-39 basis points. This suggests that the
BCsoutperformance does not result from their correlation with the observable characteristics
studied by Brennan et al. (1998).14
4.3. Earnings Announcements
This papers hypothesis is that employee satisfaction is benecial to rm value, but not im-
mediately capitalized by the market because it is intangible. Instead, it only a¤ects the stock
price when it subsequently manifests in tangible outcomes, thus generating superior long-run
returns. To provide direct evidence on this channel, I investigate whether the BCs exhibited
superior future accounting performance. Note that earnings are not the only channel through
which employee satisfaction may improve shareholder value: LeRoy and Porter (1981) nd that
stock returns are predominantly driven by factors other than earnings. Therefore, prots will
account for at most a portion of the abnormal returns. Since prots are persistent and thus
a¤ect stock returns only to the extent they are unexpected, I follow Core, Guay and Rusticus
(2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) and study earnings surprises. Using similar methodology
to these papers, I run the following regression:
Surpriseit = b0 + b1Xit + b2Zit j + "it: (3)
Surprise is the 1- or 2-year earnings surprise, or the long-term growth surprise. The 1-year
earnings surprise is the actual EPS for the scal year ending in year tminus the median I/B/E/S
analyst forecast, deated by the stock price at scal year-end. The I/B/E/S consensus forecast
is taken 8 months prior to the end of the forecast period, i.e. 4 months after the previous
scal year-end. Since the vast majority of annual reports are led within 3 months of the scal
year-end, this ensures that analysts know prior earnings when making their forecasts. The
2-year earnings surprise is calculated similarly, with the consensus forecast taken 20 months
prior to year end. As in Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Lim (2001), Teoh and Wong (2002) and
Giroud and Mueller (2010), I remove observations for which the forecast error is larger than
10% of the price. The long-run growth surprise is the actual 5-year EPS growth from I/B/E/S
minus the consensus long-run growth forecast 56 months prior. Since this measure is already
a percentage, I do not deate it. Xit is a dummy variable for whether the rm was in the
14When adding the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index as an additional control, the coe¢ cient on the
Best Companies dummy is 0.21 (0.23 for industry-adjusted returns and signicant at the 5% level). The slight
decline in the coe¢ cient does not arise because the Best Companies exhibit superior governance. The Best
Companies dummy has only a 0.01 correlation with the index. Instead, it stems entirely from a loss in obser-
vations. The governance index is only available from September 1990 onwards, and only for around 70% of the
Best Companies within this time period. Over the 1984-2009 period, there are 18,991 rm-month observations
for Best Companies. 5,349 observations are lost by starting from 1990, and a further 5,091 observations are lost
because several Best Companies are not in the governance index. The overall e¤ect is to more than halve the
number of rm-month observations to 8,551. Running the regression in Table 6 without the GIM index, but
restricting it to rms with non-missing GIM, leads to a coe¢ cient of 0.20 (0.23 for industry-adjusted returns).
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most recent BC list. Zit j is a vector of control variables, the log book-to-market ratio and the
log market capitalization at year end. These are calculated either 1, 2 or 5 years prior to the
forecast period end date, i.e. j = 1, 2 or 5. I estimate Eq. (3) using a pooled regression with
year xed e¤ects.
The results are shown in Table 7. The 1- and 2-year earnings surprises are signicantly
greater for the BCs than all other rms at the 1% level. These results are robust to controls for
the book-to-market ratio but not when size is also added as a control. This is because, contrary
to most underreaction studies, the BCs are typically large rms, and earnings surprises are
strongly positively correlated with size. Thus, 1- and 2-year earnings surprises may explain part
of the outperformance of the BCs compared to the market, but not the (lower) outperformance
versus the characteristics benchmark. However, the results for 5-year earnings growth are
robust to all controls. The stronger results for long-term growth are consistent with the view
that satisfaction is a long-run investment.15
Table 8 examines the stock price consequences of such earnings surprises, by calculating
the abnormal returns to earnings announcements. I take all earnings announcement dates from
April 1984-December 2009 from I/B/E/S and calculate 3-day (-1,+1) returns in excess of a
market model. The market model is estimated using up to 255 trading days, ending 46 days
before the event date.16 Panel A presents the results of univariate comparisons and shows that
rms in the most recent BC list exhibit abnormal returns of 0.36%, signicantly di¤erent from
the 0.08% enjoyed by other rms. Panel B shows the results of a similar regression analysis
to Table 6, using year xed e¤ects and controls. Regardless of the controls used, the BC
dummy loads signicantly. For example, the BCs exhibit a 0.36% higher announcement return
than companies of similar size and book-to-market. With four quarterly announcements per
year, earnings surprises account for over 1.4% of the BCsoutperformance. This is a meaningful
portion of the 2.9% equal-weighted alpha over characteristics benchmarks, documented in Table
3.17 I use the standard short event-study window so that the calculation of abnormal returns is
relatively insensitive to the benchmark asset pricing model used. Therefore, studying earnings
announcements also addresses the concern that the abnormal returns stem from a yet-to-be-
discovered risk factor missing from the Carhart (1997) model. Moreover, given post-earnings
announcement drift (e.g. Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Kecskes, Michaely, and Womack, 2010),
earnings surprises may account for an even greater proportion of the total excess returns. These
results are also consistent with La Porta et al. (1997), who nd that positive earnings surprises
account for a meaningful proportion of the outperformance of value over glamour portfolios.
15For robustness, I also calculate the earnings surprise scaling by assets per share rather than the stock price;
use the mean rather than median forecast as consensus; and drop observations for which there are fewer than
5 analyst forecasts to ensure that the I/B/E/S consensus is an accurate proxy for investor expectations. The
results are barely a¤ected by any of these changes.
16Results are very similar for 5-day returns, and with di¤erent benchmarks.
17I compare the return explained by earnings surprises to an equal-weighted alpha, because a regression
equally weights all observations. The value-weighted alpha over characteristics benchmarks is 1.8% so earnings
surprises account for an even greater proportion of it.
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4.4. Longevity of Outperformance
I now study the longevity of the excess returns. If they result from mispricing of employee
satisfaction rather than risk, then one might expect the drift associated with list inclusion to
decline over time, for two reasons. First, satisfaction is not a permanent characteristic as
shown in Table 1, one-third of rms drop o¤ the list each year. If a rms satisfaction declines
over time, it no longer enjoys top-100 motivation, recruitment and retention and so should
generate smaller outperformance. Put di¤erently, the value of the intangible asset ignored by
the market is lower, so there is less mispricing. Second, even for rms that remain on the list
for several years, the mispricing may be corrected over time as the market slowly learns about
their value, for example through their releases of tangible news such as earnings. However, as
shown by the prior research summarized in Section 2.2, this correction can take over ve years.
The prior literature on long-run drift calculates longevity of outperformance in two main
ways. The rst is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). It starts by calculating a stocks
benchmark-adjusted return in month t after the event. The CAR up to month t is obtained
by an arithmetic sum of the abnormal returns from month 1 to month t, and the portfolio return
is an equally-weighted average of the returns on each stock a¤ected by the event. The second is
buy-and-hold returns (BHAR). This involves calculating a stocks benchmark-unadjusted return
from month s to month t by geometrically compounding its monthly returns. The benchmark
returns over that period are calculated separately, and then subtracted from the return on each
stock. The months s and t are typically chosen to coincide with years (e.g. 1-12, 13-24 which
e¤ectively assumes rebalancing to equal-weight at the start of each year. This is to ensure that
returns are not driven by the extreme performance of a few stocks in the portfolio. Conrad and
Kaul (1993) argue that the BHAR method is more accurate for statistical reasons.
The results of these two methods are presented in Panels A and B of Table 8. Panel A shows
that the CARs continue to grow through month 54, but is virtually zero between month 54-60.
The BHAR results in Panel B are consistent: the returns drop from 2-3% in year 4 to close to
zero in year 5 and become insignicant in all specications. Both panels suggest that, as found
by prior literature, it takes several years before the abnormal returns start to decline. However,
in contrast to Agrawal, Ja¤e, and Mandelker (1992), Lakonsihok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994),
Spiess and A­ eck-Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Loughran and Vijh (1997),
I nd that the drift dies out in the fth year.
The results in both panels are consistent with both hypotheses mentioned at the start of
the subsection. The reduction in drift over time could occur either because some rms have
dropped o¤ the list, or because the market has now learned of their valuable intangibles. I start
by investigating the second hypothesis that even in rms for which satisfaction is reasonably
permanent, the abnormal returns die down because the market learns about their intangibles
over time. I conduct a similar BHAR analysis to Panel B, but focusing on rms which remain
on the list for at least the next ve years  i.e. throughout the period over which drift is
calculated. Specically, it contains rms on the 1998 list which are also on the 1999, 2000, 2001
and 2002 lists, and so on for the 1999-2005 lists. It also contains rms in the 1984 (1993) list
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which are on the 1993 (1998) list. Panel C illustrates the results; consistent with Panel B, it
nds that the returns drop markedly in the fth year and actually become slightly negative.
(Since the restriction to rms on the list for the next ve years signicantly reduces the sample
size, the results in Panel C are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles to remove the e¤ect of
outliers; however, without winsorization the returns also fall sharply and become insignicant
in year ve.) These results are consistent with a mispricing story.
I now turn to the rst channel, that returns die down over time because satisfaction is not
a permanent characteristic. I do so by studying the returns to two additional portfolios, which
contain rms that were on previous BC lists but not the latest one. Portfolio II is not reformed
or reweighted each year: it simply calculates the returns to the original 74 BCs from April
1984 to December 2009, some of which drop o¤ subsequent lists. For the Fortune subsample,
this portfolio calculates the returns of the 69 BCs in the 1998 list from February 1998 to
December 2009. (I conduct this particular analysis separately for the Fortune subsample to
allow comparison with Table 4 as well as Table 3). Portfolio III includes only companies dropped
from the list. Specically, it is created on March 1, 1993 and includes any companies that were
in the 1984 list but not in the 1993 list. On February 1, 1998, any companies that were in the
1993 list but not in the 1998 list are added, and so on. If a rm is later added back to the list,
it is removed from Portfolio III. (For the Fortune subsample, it is created on February 1, 1999.)
Like Portfolio I, Portfolios III includes rms that go public after list formation.
Portfolio II should outperform its benchmark, since it contains rms with high satisfaction
for at least part of the period. It should also underperform Portfolio I, since the latter represents
the most up-to-date list. On the other hand, if Portfolio II performs similarly to Portfolio I,
this would imply that the previous results were driven by a single portfolio: the 1984 (or 1998)
list, and thus only around 70 rms, rather than the 244 rms across the full time period. It
would also suggest that the non-permanence of employee satisfaction is not a reason for the
reduction in drift over time. The hypothesis for the relative performance of Portfolios I-II is
tentative as it is di¢ cult to evaluate rigorously: since the portfolios contain many common
stocks, their returns will be similar and likely statistically indistinguishable. However, we can
still verify whether the di¤erences are of the hypothesized sign.18
I also predict that Portfolio III performs worse than Portfolios I-II, since the former contains
companies outside the Top 100 for satisfaction. Whether it also underperforms its benchmarks
depends on the markets incorporation of intangibles. If the market fully capitalizes satisfaction,
the removal of a company from the list signals that this variable has declined from previous
expectations. Therefore, if satisfaction is positively correlated with performance, Portfolio III
should earn negative returns.19 However, if satisfaction is important but not incorporated by the
market, such a prediction is not generated. In the extreme, if the BC list is completely ignored,
satisfaction only feeds through to returns when its benets manifest in future tangible outcomes.
Hence the abnormal return of rm i depends on its level of employee welfare compared to the
18Comparing newly added versus newly dropped companies leads to economically signicant di¤erences, but
not statistical signicance since there are too few added and dropped stocks to draw inferences.
19This prediction assumes that capitalization takes at least a few weeks. If it occurs before the start of the
return compounding window, Portfolio III should earn zero abnormal returns (as should all portfolios).
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average rm, rather than compared to the markets previous assessment of rm is level of
welfare. If rm i is outside the Top 100, it may still exhibit above-average satisfaction (e.g. be
in the Top 200) and thus generate superior returns.
Panel D illustrates the results. The returns to Portfolio II are positive over all time-periods,
benchmarks and weighting methodologies, and often signicant, but it underperforms Portfolio
I in all 12 specications. These results suggest that employee satisfaction is not a permanent
characteristic and list updates contain useful information, potentially explaining why outper-
formance is particularly strong over 1998-2009. In the Fortune subperiod, the list was more
updated every year, whereas for 1984-1997 it was updated only once in a fourteen year period.
Indeed, the weaker results for the 1984 Portfolio II arise because it contained rms such as Po-
laroid, Delta Airlines, Dana and Armstrong that featured only in the 1984 list and su¤ered very
weak performance from 1993 onwards. Also as predicted, Portfolio III underperforms Portfo-
lios I in all 12 specications, and Portfolio II in all specications except for the equal-weighted
specication from 1984-2009. This strong performance disappears when value-weighting (or, in
unreported results, winsorizing). However, Portfolio III only underperforms its benchmarks for
the Fortune subsample when value-weighting (and only signicantly compared to the industry
benchmark), and outperforms signicantly in some specications. This result further suggests
that the market did not fully react when the companies in Portfolio III were initially added to
the list.
Overall, the results in all four panels of Table 9 suggest that the abnormal returns of BCs
abate over time, both because employee satisfaction is not a permanent characteristic, and the
market slowly learns about this intangible. The duration of outperformance, of approximately
four years, is slightly lower than some prior studies and thus implies a lower level of mispricing.
5. Discussion
Section 4 has documented a signicant correlation between employee satisfaction and future
stock returns that is robust to controls for risk, industries, rm characteristics and outliers.
There are a number of potential explanations for this association:
Hypothesis A: Employee satisfaction causes superior future stock returns, and this link was
not fully valued by the market.
Hypothesis B: Employee satisfaction is irrelevant for shareholder value, but list inclusion
causes higher returns via irrational market reactions or demand from SRI funds.
Hypothesis C: Employee satisfaction is irrelevant for shareholder value, but list inclusion
causes higher returns because the market erroneously believes it is detrimental to value. Listed
rms thus trade at an initial discount, and the higher returns are a correction of this.
Hypothesis D: Expectations of superior future stock returns cause high satisfaction today.
Hypothesis E: There is no causal relationship in either direction between satisfaction and
stock returns, but a third variable causes both.
The results of Tables 7 and 8 provide support for Hypothesis A: that employee satisfaction
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is not directly capitalized, but only a¤ects the stock price when it subsequently manifests in
tangible outcomes that are valued by the market. The evidence of Table 9, that the abnormal
returns eventually die out with a longevity similar to other mispricing studies, is also consistent
with this hypothesis. This section evaluates the alternative explanations.
As stated in the introduction, stock returns have several advantages as a dependent vari-
able: they are critical for the papers three goals. However, they also have some limitations.
While they should incorporate all channels through which satisfaction can a¤ect fundamental
value, they may also be inuenced by factors unrelated to fundamental value, such as irrational
speculation. Thus, even if there is causality, it could be list inclusion per se rather than satis-
faction that is causing superior returns. Hypothesis B is that the superior returns did not stem
from a true increase in rm value. For example, satisfaction may be irrelevant for shareholder
value, but the market erroneously believes that a relationship exists and reacts irrationally
positively to list inclusion. This hypothesis is contradicted by the superior earnings surprises
of the BCs, which represent an increase in fundamental value. Moreover, Gilbert et al. (2010)
and Huberman and Regev (2001) show that irrational reactions to non-information are concen-
trated immediately after the announcement of irrelevant news. Here, the event-study window
is excluded from the return calculation.
A similar explanation is that list inclusion led to buying by SRI funds because it allows the
stocks to pass SRI screens; if demand curves are downward-sloping, this raises prices. Such
purchases may take time to be executed and need not occur within the month of list announce-
ment. In addition to the earnings announcement results, an additional piece of evidence against
this explanation is the mild outperformance of the dropped companies in Portfolio III. For a
more systematic evaluation of this hypothesis, I study whether SRI funds indeed are overweight
the BCs, and whether they increased this weighting over time. There is substantial heterogene-
ity across SRI funds and many screen on factors orthogonal to employee satisfaction, such as
animal testing and environmental protection. I therefore must be careful to select funds that
use employment screens in particular. My main data source is the Social Investment Forum20,
which contains details of each SRI fund and 11 di¤erent screening criteria, two of which are la-
bor relations and employment/equality. For each fund and criterion, there are three categories.
Positive Investment denotes that the fund is more likely to invest in a rm that surpasses an
upper bar for the criterion, Restricted Investment denotes that the fund will seek to avoid rms
that fall below a lower bar, and No Screen denotes that the fund does not use that criterion.21
The classications for labor relations and employment/equality are highly correlated, with only
one fund having a di¤erent designation between the two. I supplement this source with data
from SocialFunds22, which provides a similar table. 1 of its 10 screens is employment.23 There
20http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/mfpc/screening.cfm.
21The other screens are alcohol, tobacco, gambling, defense/weapons, animal testing, products/services, en-
vironment, human rights, and community investment. For the rst four screens, there is a fourth option of No
Investment, which is stronger than Restricted Investment and denotes that the fund will not invest in any
company that produces these products. There is no such option for the labor or employment screens.
22http://www.socialfunds.com/funds/chart.cgi?sfChartId=Social+Issues.
23The other screens are shareholder advocacy, community investment, environment, human rights, employ-
ment, product safety, weapons, animal rights, nuclear power, and alcohol/tobacco/gambling.
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is considerable overlap between the two data sources; when there is disagreement, I read the
fund prospectus to see whether it mentions an employment screen. If it does not, I call the fund
to verify whether it uses such a screen. For example, such calls uncovered that the Ariel Fund
does not use employment screens, contrary to the data from SocialFunds. I also called all major
fund families (even when there was no disagreement between the data sources) to verify that
the screening criteria have not changed over time, and that the family did not previously have
a fund that screened on employment that is now defunct and thus not in either data source.
I drop funds that invest exclusively overseas or in bonds, or are not in the CDA/Spectrum
database, from which I obtain fund holdings. Table 10 contains the nal list of employment
fundswhich use either a Positive or Restricted Investment screen on labor or employment.24
I run the following regression:
EOit = c0 + c1Xit + c2Zit + "it: (4)
EOit is the percentage ownership of stock i across all employment funds in Table 10 at the end
of December of year t. Xit is a dummy variable for whether the rm was in the most recent
BC list, and Zit is a vector of control variables. Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), I use
the following controls: log size, log M/B, the inverse stock price, S&P 500 dummy and Nasdaq
dummy (all measured at the end of year t), as well as the standard deviation of daily returns and
average monthly return (measured in year t). I also use industry dummy variables.25 Also as in
Hong and Kacperczyk I run a panel regression with year xed e¤ects and cluster standard errors
at the industry level, since a funds investment in a particular stock may increase (reduce) its
probability of owning an industry peer for specialization (diversication) reasons. The results
are very similar using Fama-MacBeth (1973) and are available upon request.
Table 11 shows that employment funds indeed overweight the BCs. To investigate whether
overweighting has increased over time, I add an additional regressor, Yit, to Eq. (4), where
Yit = (Y ear  1984)Xit; it is signicant. I next calibrate the extent to which this increase in
demand can explain the superior returns. Employment funds owned $5m of BC stock in 1984
and $1,653m in 2007. (To form an upper bound on the excess return that can be explained
by increased demand, I take the 2007 gures as they are the highest.) The total value of the
BCs was $303,169m in 1984 and $1,703,218m in 2007. Thus, the increase in employment funds
ownership of BC stock is driven in part by the increase in market value of the BCs rather
than new purchases. Again to form an upper bound, I assume that the entire $1,648m increase
stems from new purchases. The next step is to turn this into a percentage change in demand.
To maximize the percentage change, I take the 1984 value of BCs as the denominator, which
translates into a 0.54% increase. The e¤ect on stock prices is given by
24List inclusion can a¤ect the holdings of funds with both Positive and Restricted screens, since it may directly
cause a positively screening fund to buy the stock, and remove limitations previously preventing a restrictively
screening fund from buying the stock. Therefore, the main specication includes employment funds that impose
both types of screen, but I also run the results focusing only on funds that positively screen.
25HK do not use industry dummy variables because their denition of sin stocks is at the industry level; they
instead use the industry beta. Industry dummies are feasible in the present setting, and control for broader
di¤erences across industries than their betas.
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P = 0:0054="; (5)
where " is the absolute price elasticity of demand. Estimates of " range widely: Shleifer (1986)
and Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest a unit elasticity, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)
estimate " = 8 and Scholes (1972) calibrates " = 3; 000. Using " = 1, again to create an upper
bound, yields a 0.54% abnormal return, or only 0.02% per year.26 This is substantially smaller
than the 3.5% annual alpha, and so in-sample purchases cannot explain the excess returns.27
Hypothesis C is that satisfaction has no e¤ect on shareholder value, but the market believed
that it has a negative e¤ect (owing to traditional views that it represents wasteful expenditure,
e.g. Taylor, 1912) and so reduced its initial valuation of the BCs. Under this hypothesis, the
subsequent superior returns are merely correction of temporary undervaluation rather than any
direct benet of satisfaction. This interpretation echoes Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who nd
that sinstocksabnormal returns stemmed from their initial undervaluation. Again, it is list
inclusion rather than satisfaction that is causing the superior returns.
This hypothesis is contradicted by the slightly positive event-study returns to list inclusion
documented by Faleye and Trahan (2006), which I also conrm in unreported results. An
additional test is to examine whether the BCs traded at a value discount to their peers at the
start of the return compounding period. Hypotheses A and C have di¤erent predictions as to
whether an initial discount should exist. Hypothesis A posits that the BCs are undervalued
relative to their true fundamental value (comprised of tangible and intangible assets) since their
intangible value is partially ignored. However, it does not predict that the BCs should have
lower observed valuation ratios than peers, because the denominator of traditional valuation
ratios (e.g. market-to-book) does not consider intangibles. For example, assume that rm 1
has $2bn of tangible assets and thus a true value of $2bn; rm 2 has $2bn of tangible assets and
has spent $1bn on intangibles. Under hypothesis A, rm 2s intangibles are valuable and so its
true value is $3bn, but it trades at $2.4bn as the market only partially incorporates intangibles.
Thus, rm 1 (2) exhibits a M/B ratio of 1 (1.2) and so rm 2s subsequent abnormal returns
arise not because it trades at an initial discount, but because it has valuable intangibles which
were not fully priced initially. Under hypothesis C, rm 2s intangibles are worthless and so
its true value is also $2bn, but the market values it at $1.5bn because it infers that wasteful
expenditure on intangibles implies more general agency problems. Firm 2 therefore trades at
an initial M/B of 0.75 and thus a discount to rm 1; its subsequent abnormal returns result
entirely from a correction of this discount.
26Inows into Best Companies require outows from other rms, and thus reduce the performance of bench-
marks. Since the outows will be spread over the thousands of stocks that are not Best Companies, the outows
from a particular stock will be negligible.
27The main reason why increased ownership by employment funds is unable to explain a signicant portion
of the Best Companiesoutperformance is there are very few such funds, and so they have little price impact. I
therefore rerun equation (4) using total institutional ownership as the dependent variable, since institutions in
aggregate hold substantially more assets than employment funds. However, I nd institutions are underweighted
on the Best Companies. These results remain similar when studying only ownership by banks, insurance
companies and other institutions, who are more likely to be constrained by social norms (Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009)). The results are available upon request.
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I therefore run the following regression:
V ALit = d0 + d1Xit + d2Zit 1 + "it, (6)
at the beginning of each return compounding window. V ALit is the valuation of stock i at the
start of the return compounding period in year t (i.e. end of March for t = 1984, February
for t = 1993, January for 1998   2009)). Similar to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) I use three
valuation ratios: the log market-to-book ratio (M/B), the log price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) and
the log aggregate value-to-EBITDA ratio (AV/EBITDA).28 I drop observations for which the
denominator is negative. Xit is a dummy variable for whether the rm is in that months BC
list, and Zit 1 is a vector of control variables measured as of December of the previous year.
Following Hong and Kacperczyk I use the rms return on equity (ROE) as well as the next
three years ROEs, R&D as a fraction of sales, a dummy variable if R&D is missing, and an
S&P 500 dummy. I estimate Eq. (6) using Fama-MacBeth (1973), adjusting standard errors
for potential autocorrelation.
The results are shown in Table 12. The BCs exhibit higher valuation ratios based on all three
measures. These ndings are inconsistent with Hypothesis C but consistent with Hypothesis
A, as well as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) who show that rms with strong governance
earned abnormal returns while trading at a valuation premium at the start of the return window.
The higher ratios suggest that the market is at least partially valuing the intangibles. This result
is also consistent with the drift studies summarized in Section 2.2, which nds that the market
generally values corporate events in the correct direction, but signicantly underestimates the
magnitudes. Indeed, in the above numerical example, rm 2 trades at an initial premium.
Since the setting is not a natural experiment with random assignment of employee satisfac-
tion to rms, non-causal explanations also exist. Hypothesis D is that superior performance
leads to satisfaction. The use of stock returns as a dependent variable addresses concerns of
reverse causation in the absence of private information past, current and expected future
protability should all be incorporated in the current stock price, and so protable rms should
not outperform going forwards. However, if employees have superior information about their
rms future stock returns, those with positive information may report higher satisfaction to-
day. This explanation is unlikely for a number of reasons. Existing empirical studies suggest
that employees do not have private information: Benartzi (2001) shows that employees make
incorrect decisions when allocating their 401(k) accounts to company stock, and Bergman and
Jenter (2007) nd that rms are able to lower total compensation by granting their workers
overvalued options in lieu of salary. Even if employees do have superior information, it is likely
to be about near-term returns, given that managers are unable to forecast returns past 100 days
(Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner, 2010). Since they must return the questionnaires by the end
of June, 7 months before the start of the return compounding window the following February
1, this will not a¤ect the results. It is also plausible that employees who predict higher future
28Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) use the price-to-EBITDA ratio. Since the EBITDA represents prots to both
debtholders and equityholders, I use the aggregate value of both debt and equity in the numerator. AV/EBITDA
is una¤ected by changes in capital structure.
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returns will perceive the stock as undervalued today, potentially reducing satisfaction.29
Hypothesis E is that the link between satisfaction and returns arises because a third unob-
servable variable causes both, such as good management (Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen,
2009, 2010)  i.e. the BC dummy proxies for an omitted variable. While I rule out correla-
tion with industries, factor loadings and an extensive list of observable characteristics, by their
very nature unobservables cannot be used as regressors. The standard solution is to introduce
rm xed e¤ects to absorb the unobservables and identify purely on within-rm changes in
the variable in question. This approach cannot be used here because xed e¤ects require the
unobservables to be constant over time, but a change in satisfaction could be caused by changes
in management practices. In addition, there is limited within-rm variation in list inclusion:
many rms remain in the list for several years, and a rm removed from the list may still exhibit
signicantly above-average satisfaction (e.g. be in the Top 200). Thus, such an approach would
be biased towards nding no relationship (Zhou, 2001).30
If the results were entirely driven by a combination of Hypotheses D and E, then satisfaction
has no causal e¤ect on returns and the introduction of employee-friendly programs would have
no impact. However, other conclusions from this paper would be una¤ected. It still remains
that the market does not incorporate intangibles (be they satisfaction, good management, or
workersprivate information) even when made public; that investors underreact to even widely
disseminated news concerning large companies; and that an SRI investor could have earned
excess returns by trading on the BC list.
Another caveat shared by many other long-run event studies is that the sample size is small.
The BC survey contains only 100 rms per year (of which typically 50-70 are publicly traded).
Since these rms are all in the right tail of satisfaction, this small sample may not reect the
relationship between shareholder returns and the whole range of levels of satisfaction. It may be
that a positive link only exists at very high levels, and there is no di¤erence between moderate
and very low satisfaction. The mild outperformance of Portfolio III in most specications
suggests that the results extend to moderate satisfaction levels, under the assumption that
rms that drop outside the Top 100 remain above-average, but this is yet to be shown directly.
A standard concern with a small sample is that it may be predominantly composed of small
rms that are relatively unimportant for the overall economy, and any excess returns are hard
to exploit given transactions costs. This concern does not apply here, given the size of the
BCs.31 In addition, while the paper documents superior returns to an SRI screen based on
29Furthermore, the Best Companies survey does not simply ask employees the general question of rating their
satisfaction, which could indeed lead to optimistic employees reporting high satisfaction. Instead, the survey
covers very specic questions, such as communication to employees, corporate philanthropy, and diversity, which
aim to specically target satisfaction rather than optimism.
30An alternative approach would be to use random variation in some rm-specic characteristic that was
causal for employee satisfaction but has no direct e¤ect on stock returns. Unfortunately, I have been unable
to identify such an appropriate instrument. For example, natural experiments such as exploiting labor law
regulatory change are not rm-specic.
31In addition to issues on the generalizability of the results to the rest of the distribution, another issue with
a small sample is that it increases the risk that results are anomalous and driven by a few observations. This
is addressed by a battery of tests showing that the results are robust to weighting methodologies, winsorization
of outliers, and controlling simultaneously for systematic risk and rm characteristics.
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employee relations, its results may not extend to other SRI screens (e.g. environmental policy).
My ndings provide an a priori motivation for extending the investigation to other screens:
if other forms of stakeholder capital also benet shareholders (e.g. low pollution means
that a rm is well-placed to comply with increasing environmental regulations) and are also
undervalued by the market, certain other screens may also improve returns. However, this
has yet to be shown directly. Note that traditional portfolio theory predicts that any screen
reduces investment returns by restricting the investors choice set, so nding even one screen
that improves returns is su¢ cient to challenge this classical view.
Finally, other factors that may lead to the results being understated. Under Hypothesis A,
the portfolio returns only capture the benets of satisfaction that have manifested in tangible
outcomes within the time period studied. However, certain benets (such as developing a new
patent) may not become visible for several years and thus not be captured by the results,
particularly for the later lists. Some rms may choose not to be considered for the BC list,
perhaps because their reputations for employee welfare are already strong and they do not
need independent certication. Thus, there may be many companies with high satisfaction and
stronger returns than the mean BC, that are not considered by this analysis.
6. Conclusion
This paper nds that rms with high levels of employee satisfaction generate superior long-
horizon returns, even when controlling for industries, factor risk or a broad set of observable
characteristics. These ndings imply that the market fails to incorporate intangible assets fully
into stock valuations even if the existence of such assets is veried by a widely respected and
highly publicized survey on large companies. Instead, an intangible only a¤ects the stock price
when it subsequently manifests in tangibles that are valued by the market, such as earnings
announcements. This suggests that the non-incorporation of intangibles, documented by prior
studies, is not simply due to the lack of salient information on them. It also provides empirical
support for managerial myopia theories, which require the assumption that long-run investment
is not valued by investors. Even if managers are able to credibly communicate the value of their
intangible investment, it may still not a¤ect outsidersvaluations, and so they may be reluctant
to invest in the rst place. A separate implication is that an SRI screen based on employee
welfare may improve investment performance, in contrast to existing views that any SRI screen
necessarily reduces investor returns.
The results are consistent with human relations theories which argue that employee sat-
isfaction causes stronger corporate performance through improved recruitment, retention and
motivation, and existing studies of underpricing of intangibles and long-run drift to corporate
events. However, the studys implications for the future stock performance of rms with supe-
rior employee satisfaction is unclear. The main hypothesis for the excess returns found in this
paper is that the market believed in the negative or zero relationship predicted by traditional
frameworks and documented by existing evidence, and was caught unawares by the changing
nature of the rm which means that employee satisfaction is now benecial. If the market has
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now learned of the positive correlation between list inclusion and future returns, one should
expect the returns to go down over time. However, if the market does not update (e.g. be-
cause intangibles are inherently di¢ cult to incorporate into stock prices) and arbitrage remains
limited, the superior returns may persist going forward.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
The second column details the number of Best Companies that had returns available on
CRSP for at least one month between publication of the list of that year, and the subsequent
list. The third column gives the number of new public companies added to the Best Companies
list of that year. The fourth column contains the number of companies on the previous Best
Companies list which no longer feature in the current list or are no longer public.
Year of List Best Companies Added Dropped
1984 78
1993 69 30 39
1998 70 34 33
1999 68 26 28
2000 60 20 28
2001 55 15 20
2002 55 13 13
2003 61 14 8
2004 57 11 15
2005 58 11 10
2006 50 8 16
2007 47 10 13
2008 42 11 16
2009 39 7 10
26
Table 2: Summary Characteristics
Summary characteristics for the 74 companies in the 1984 100 Best Companies to Work
For in Americalist that were public on April 1, 1984, and the 69 companies in the 1998 list
published in Fortune that were public on February 1, 1998. The rst two items are taken from
CRSP at the end of March 1984 (January 1998, respectively.) The last three items are based
on CRSP and Compustat data for 1997 (1983), missing for companies that were not traded in
1997 (1983), and excluded for companies for which only the ADRs are traded.
# obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
1984 list
Market Cap ($ bn) 74 3.99 1.25 9.48 0 69.47
Price ($) 74 37.43 33.88 19.64 5.91 113.75
Dividend yield (%) 69 2.45 2.22 2.03 0 9.06
Market/book 69 2.41 1.95 1.82 0.68 10.80
Intangibles as a % of total assets (%) 69 0.91 0 2.15 0 10.35
1998 list
Market Cap ($ bn) 69 21.33 5.24 39.52 0.03 204.59
Price ($) 69 51.35 44.22 25.47 5.38 127.56
Dividend yield (%) 63 1.60 1.03 4.31 0 34.26
Market/book 63 5.20 4.13 4.22 -5.34 20.91
Intangibles as a % of total assets (%) 63 5.23 0.08 7.76 0 29.97
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Table 3: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Monthly regressions of portfolio returns on the four Carhart (1997) factors, MKT , HML,
SMB, and MOM . The dependent variable is the portfolio return less either the risk-free rate,
the industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return. Panel
A contains equal-weighted returns and Panel B contains value-weighted returns. The alpha
is the excess risk-adjusted return. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is April
1984-December 2009.
Excess returns over
Risk-free Industry Characteristics
Panel A (equal-weighted)
 0.31 0.20 0.24
(3.34)*** (2.76)*** (2.94)***
MKT 1.08 0.06 0.09
(41.01)*** (3.55)*** (3.69)***
HML 0.03 0.09 0.01
(0.70) (3.22)*** (0.45)
SMB 0.17 0.15 0.05
(3.66)*** (5.70)*** (1.39)
MOM -0.15 -0.07 -0.09
(-6.36)*** (-3.39)*** (-4.80)***
Panel B (value-weighted)
 0.29 0.17 0.15
(2.59)*** (2.28)** (2.15)**
MKT 1.00 -0.04 0.01
(35.68)*** (-0.18) (0.59)
HML -0.37 -0.03 -0.11
(-7.64)*** (-0.76) (-3.32)***
SMB -0.17 -0.21 -0.03
(-3.64)*** (-6.63)*** (-0.88)
MOM -0.06 -0.02 -0.04
(-1.78)* (-0.81) (-2.11)**
# obs 309 309 309
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 4: Risk-Adjusted Returns from 1998
Monthly regressions of portfolio returns on the four Carhart (1997) factors, MKT , HML,
SMB, and MOM . The dependent variable is the portfolio return less either the risk-free rate,
the industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return. Panel
A contains equal-weighted returns and Panel B contains value-weighted returns. The alpha is
the excess risk-adjusted return. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is February
1998-December 2009.
Excess returns over
Risk-free Industry Characteristics
Panel A (equal-weighted)
 0.44 0.31 0.43
(2.89)*** (2.62)*** (3.46)***
Panel B (value-weighted)
 0.32 0.19 0.16
(1.65)* (1.50) (1.35)
# obs 143 143 143
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
Table 5: Risk-Adjusted Returns of Winsorized Portfolios
Monthly regressions of portfolio returns on the four Carhart (1997) factors, MKT , HML,
SMB, andMOM . The returns of the Best Companies are winsorized at the x% and (100  x)%
levels across the sample period. The dependent variable is the winsorized portfolio return less
either the risk-free rate, the industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched
portfolio return. Panel A contains equal-weighted returns and Panel B contains value-weighted
returns. The alpha is the excess risk-adjusted return. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sam-
ple period is April 1984-December 2009 for the left-hand column, and February 1998-December
2009 for the right-hand column.
x = 5 x = 10
Risk-free Industry Characteristics Risk-free Industry Characteristics
Panel A (equal-weighted)
 0.35 0.23 0.28 0.40 0.29 0.33
(3.49)*** (2.80)*** (3.10)*** (4.18)*** (3.36)*** (3.76)***
Panel B (value-weighted)
 0.35 0.23 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.25
(3.33)*** (3.16)*** (2.66)*** (3.93)*** (3.61)*** (3.15)***
# obs 309 309 309 309 309 309
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 6: Characteristics Regressions
Monthly regressions of individual stock returns on a dummy variable for whether the rm
was in the most recent Best Companies list (BC) and the characteristics used in Brennan,
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998). SIZE is the log of the rms market capitalization (in
billions) in month t   2. BM is the log of the rms book-to-market ratio as of the calendar
year-end before the most recent June. YIELD is the rms dividend yield as of the calendar
year-end before the most recent June. RET2-3, RET4-6 and RET7-12 are the logs of the
compounded returns in, respectively, month t  3 to month t  2, month t  6 to month t  4,
and month t   12 to month t   7. DVOL is the dollar trading volume (in millions) in month
t  2. PRC is the price at the end of month t  2. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample
period is April 1984-December 2009 for the left-hand column, and February 1998-December
2009 for the right-hand column.
1984-2009 1998-2009
Raw Industry-Adjusted Raw Industry-Adjusted
BC 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.27
(3.68)*** (3.58)*** (1.87)* (1.72)*
SIZE 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.05
(1.86)* (2.43)** (0.34) (0.43)
BM 0.21 0.22 0.09 0.10
(4.41)*** (5.79)*** (1.12) (1.61)
YIELD -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.00
(-2.45)** (-3.24)*** (0.20) (-0.28)
RET2-3 0.77 0.39 1.04 0.53
(2.64)*** (1.40) (1.92)* (1.04)
RET4-6 0.73 0.49 0.88 0.45
(2.90)*** (2.07)** (1.89)* (1.03)
RET7-12 0.89 0.67 0.58 0.31
(5.19)*** (4.13)*** (1.93)* (1.08)
DVOL -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05
(-1.51) (-1.90)* (-0.17) (-0.51)
PRC -0.29 -0.23 -0.40 -0.25
(-2.66)*** (-2.20)** (-2.16)** (-1.35)
Constant 2.04 1.27 1.59 1.39
(6.08)*** (3.01)*** (2.84)*** (1.95)*
# obs 1,691,492 1,673,440 819,956 813,707
Number of groups 309 309 143 143
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 7: Earnings Surprises
Regressions of earnings surprises on a dummy variable for whether the rm was in the most
recent Best Companies list (BC) and controls (BM, log book-to-market and SIZE, log market
equity) calculated at the previous year-end. The 1- (2-) year earnings surprise is the actual
EPS minus the I/B/E/S median analyst forecast 8 (20) months prior to the end of the forecast
period, scaled by the stock price. The long-term growth surprise is the actual 5-year annualized
EPS growth rate minus the I/B/E/S median analyst long-term growth forecast from 56 months
earlier. The Best Company dummy and control variables are taken from the same month as the
I/B/E/S median forecast. Panel A (B) contains the results for 1- (2-) year earnings surprises;
Panel C contains the results for long-term growth surprises. All coe¢ cients are multiplied
by 1,000. All regressions include year xed e¤ects and a constant, not reported for brevity.
t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is April 1984-December 2009.
Panel A (1-year earnings) (1) (2) (3)
BC 3.63 3.17 -1.14
(5.26)*** (4.60)*** (-1.63)
BM -1.21 -0.41
(-12.26)** (-4.01)**
SIZE 1.80
(31.26)***
# obs 75,813 72,164 72,164
Panel B (2-year earnings)
BC 3.89 4.02 -0.10
(4.69)*** (4.84)*** (-0.12)
BM 0.41 1.23
(3.00)*** (8.80)***
SIZE 1.93
(23.82)***
# obs 51,076 49,156 49,156
Panel C (long-term growth)
BC 2.27 3.55 1.46
(4.08)*** (6.37)*** (2.57)***
BM 2.82 3.34
(26.72)*** (30.52)***
SIZE 1.02
(16.89)***
# obs 34,710 33,510 33,510
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 8: Earnings Announcement Returns
(-1,+1) abnormal returns to quarterly earnings announcements. Abnormal returns are cal-
culated above a market model in which the coe¢ cients are estimated over a 255-day period
ending 46 days before the earnings announcement. Panel A compares the average announce-
ment returns to rms included in the most recent Best Companies list with the returns to all
other rms. Panel B regresses announcement returns on a dummy variable for whether the
rm was in the most recent Best Companies list (BC) and controls (BM, log book-to-market
and SIZE, log market equity) calculated at the previous year-end. These regressions include
year xed e¤ects and a constant, not reported for brevity. t-statistics are in parentheses. The
sample period is April 1984-December 2009.
Panel A (univariate comparisons)
Best Company Other rms
CAR 0.36 0.08
# obs 5,241 311,328
t-stat (di¤erence from 0) (40.57)*** (5.01)***
t-stat (di¤erence in means) (2.20)**
Panel B (regressions) (1) (2) (3)
BC 0.29 0.43 0.36
(2.36)** (3.49)*** (2.83)***
BM 0.31 0.33
(17.17)*** (17.37)***
SIZE 0.03
(3.12)***
# obs 316,569 296,826 296,826
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 9: Longevity Analysis
Panel A calculates cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to portfolios of the Best Companies
in calendar time. The abnormal return of stock in event month t is calculated by subtracting
its benchmark return t months after list inclusion. The CAR through month t is an arithmetic
sum of the abnormal returns from months 1 through t. Panel B calculates the buy-and-hold
returns (BHAR). It rst geometrically compounds the unadjusted returns of a Best Company
from month 1-12, 13-24 etc. and then subtracts the geometrically-compounded benchmark
return over the same period. Panel C calculates the BHAR to companies that remain on the
list for the following ve years, winsorizing at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Panel D contains
monthly regressions of the returns of Portfolios II and III on the four Carhart (1997) factors,
MKT , HML, SMB, and MOM . The alpha is the excess risk-adjusted return. t-statistics are
in parentheses. The sample period is April 1984-December 2009 for Panels A-C and given in
the headings for Panel D.
Panel A: CARs CAR over
Month Market Industry Characteristics
6 2.11 2.21 1.56
12 5.57 4.72 4.76
18 7.26 6.65 5.80
24 10.36 8.66 8.82
30 11.50 10.36 9.32
36 15.73 12.88 12.54
42 18.63 15.92 14.09
48 21.03 17.33 16.03
54 24.10 20.57 18.68
60 24.21 20.68 18.66
Panel B: BHARs BHAR over
Months Market Industry Characteristics
1-12 5.07 4.53 4.84
(2.11)** (1.94)* (1.90)*
13-24 2.66 2.24 2.66
(1.88)* (1.73)* (1.91)*
25-36 3.32 2.63 1.87
(2.41)** (2.05)* (1.36)
37-48 3.35 2.90 1.94
(2.44)** (2.25)** (1.61)
49-60 0.33 0.81 0.27
(0.24) (0.62) (0.21)
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Panel C: BHARs of rms on list for 5 years
BHAR over
Months Market Industry Characteristics
1-12 9.47 6.97 6.81
(5.28)*** (4.34)*** (3.63)***
13-24 6.63 4.30 5.41
(3.81)*** (2.82)*** (3.18)***
25-36 3.10 2.13 2.45
(1.90)* (1.49) (1.50)
37-48 2.95 2.28 2.38
(1.95)* (1.62) (1.68)*
49-60 -0.36 -0.07 -0.82
(-0.23) (-0.04) (-0.56)
Panel D: Alphas 1984-2009: excess returns over 1998-2009: excess returns over
Risk-free Industry Characteristics Risk-free Industry Characteristics
Equal-Weighted
, II 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.44 0.28 0.34
(2.15)** (1.44) (1.41) (2.97)*** (2.55)** (2.50)**
, III 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.34 0.26 0.27
(2.68)*** (2.16)** (2.36)** (1.75)* (1.82)* (1.96)*
Value-Weighted
, II 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.08 0.11
(2.31)** (1.85)* (2.36)** (1.17) (0.62) (0.87)
, III 0.16 0.04 0.04 -0.21 -0.29 -0.19
(1.44) (0.34) (0.63) (-1.08) (-2.13)** (-1.44)
# obs 309 for II, 202 for III 143 for II, 131 for III
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 10: List of Employment Funds
SRI funds that invest in domestic equity and use labor or employment screens. The main
data sources are the Social Investment Forum and SocialFunds. Any conicts were resolved by
reading the fund prospectus or calling the fund. (P) denotes that the fund employs a Positive
Investment screen on labor or employment, and (R) denotes a Restricted Investment screen.
AHA Socially Responsible Equity (P) LKCM Acquinas Small Cap (R)
Appleseed (P) LKCM Acquinas Value (R)
Calvert Aggressive Allocation (P) MMA Praxis Core Stock (P)
Calvert Capital Accumulation (P) MMA Praxis Growth Index (P)
Calvert Conservative Allocation (P) MMA Praxis Intermediate Income (P)
Calvert Global Alternative Energy (P) MMA Praxis International (P)
Calvert International Opportunities (P) MMA Praxis Small Cap (P)
Calvert Large Cap Growth (P) MMA Praxis Value Index (P)
Calvert Mid Cap Value (P) Neuberger Berman Socially Responsible (P)
Calvert Moderate Allocation (P) New Alternatives (P)
Calvert New Vision Small Cap (P) Parnassus (P)
Calvert Small Cap Value (P) Parnassus Mid-Cap (P)
Calvert Social Index (P) Parnassus Small-Cap (P)
Calvert Social Investment Balanced (P) Parnassus Workplace (P)
Calvert Social Investment Enhanced Equity (P) Pax World Balanced (P)
Calvert Social Investment Equity (P) Pax World Growth (P)
Calvert World Values International (P) Pax World High Yield (P)
Domini Social Equity (P) Pax World Value (P)
Dreyfus Premier Third Century (R) Pax World Womens Equity (R)
Epiphany Faith and Family Values 100 (P) Sentinel Sustainable Core Opportunities (P)
Flex-Funds Total Return Utilities (R) Sentinel Sustainable Emerging Companies (P)
Green Century Equity (P) TIAA CREF Inst Social Choice Equity (P)
Integrity Growth and Income (R) Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund (R)
Legg Mason Partners Social Awareness (P) Walden Social Balanced (P)
LKCM Acquinas Growth (R) Walden Social Equity (P)
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Table 11: Holdings by Employment Funds
Regressions of a stocks aggregate ownership by employment funds at year-end on a dummy
variable for whether the rm was is in the most recent Best Companies list (BC) and various
control variables. SIZE is log market equity, MB is the log market-to-book ratio, PRINV is
the inverse of the stock price, NASDAQ and SP500 are dummy variables for inclusion in the
Nasdaq and S&P 500 indices (all measured at year-end), STD is the standard deviation of
daily stock returns andMORET is the average monthly return (all measured over the year). In
specications (3) and (4) I include YEARBC, dened as (Y ear   1984)BC. The coe¢ cients
are estimated using a panel regression with industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is 1984-
2009. Columns (1) and (3) consider funds that use positive or restrictive employment screens.
Columns (2) and (4) only consider funds that employ positive employment screens alone. All
coe¢ cients are multiplied by 1,000.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Funds Positive Funds All Funds Positive Funds
BC 0.330 0.328 -0.101 -0.083
(3.27)*** (3.28)*** (-0.62) (-0.52)
YEARBC 0.039 0.038
(3.49)*** (3.35)***
SIZE 0.054 0.052 0.053 0.051
(8.01)*** (7.75)*** (7.98)*** (7.72)***
MB -0.029 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030
(-2.84)*** (-2.84)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.89)***
PRINV 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012
(6.58)*** (6.29)*** (6.44)*** (6.15)***
STD -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.81)* (-1.88)* (-1.82)* (-1.89)*
MORET -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.96)*** (-2.92)*** (-2.90)*** (-2.85)***
NASDAQ 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029
(1.32) (1.36) (1.31) (1.34)
SP500 0.001 -0.005 0.005 -0.001
(0.03) (-0.17) (0.17) (-0.03)
Constant -0.282 -0.273 -0.284 -0.275
(-5.91)*** (-5.76)*** (-5.97)*** (-5.81)***
# obs 143,487 143,487 143,487 143,487
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Table 12: Valuation Regressions
Regressions of a stocks valuation on a dummy variable for whether the rm is in the current
Best Companies list (BC) and various control variables. The three valuation measures are MB,
the log market-to-book ratio, PE, the log price-to-earnings ratio, and AVEBITDA, the log
ratio of aggregate value to EBITDA, and measured at the end of each month in which a Best
Companies list was published, i.e. March 1984, February 1993, and January 1998-2007. I
drop observations for which the denominator of the valuation ratio is negative. The control
variables are all measured at December of the previous year: ROE is the return on equity,
FROE, F2ROE and F3ROE are the returns on equity for the next three years, RDSALES is
the ratio of R&D to sales, RDMISS is a dummy variable for whether R&D is missing, and
SP500 is a dummy variable for inclusion in the S&P 500 index. The coe¢ cients are estimated
using Fama-MacBeth (1973). t-statistics are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
MB PE AVEBITDA
BC 0.384 0.092 0.145
(9.24)*** (2.14)* (3.57)***
ROE 0.006 -0.297 -0.063
(0.49) (-1.17) (-1.07)
RDSALES 0.030 2.086 0.803
(1.09) (4.73)*** (1.81)*
RDMISS -0.100 -0.017 -0.055
(-4.46)*** (-0.89) (-2.06)*
SP500 0.583 0.330 0.168
(6.62)*** (4.65)*** (3.64)***
FROE 0.038 0.038 0.006
(1.25) (0.88) (0.79)
F2ROE 0.008 0.070 0.016
(1.68) (1.04) (0.93)
F3ROE 0.003 0.008 0.000
(2.48)** (2.23)** (0.22)
Constant -0.083 2.105 2.013
(-0.33) (11.06)*** (10.74)***
# obs 47,097 35,258 39,381
Number of groups 12 12 12
*: Signicant at the 10% level; **: Signicant at the 5% level; ***: Signicant at the 1% level
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Appendix: Calculation of Variables
This table details the calculation of various variables used in the analysis. The numbers in
parentheses refer to Compustat line items.
Item Calculation
BM Book equity / market equity. Book equity = shareholdersequity - preferred
stock + balance sheet deferred taxes (35) + FASB106 adjustment (330).
Shareholdersequity = stockholdersequity (216) if not missing, else total
common equity (60) plus preferred stock par value (130) if both are present,
else total assets (6) minus total liabilities (181), if both are present.
Preferred stock = redemption value (56), liquidating value (10), or carrying
value (130), in that order, as available.
PE Price / Earnings. Earnings = income before extraordinary items for common
shareholders (237) + deferred taxes (50) + investment tax credit (50).
AV EBITDA Aggregate value / EBITDA. Aggregate value = market equity + market
value plus net debt. Net debt = long-term debt (9) + debt in current
liabilities (34) - cash and short-term investments (1). EBITDA = operating
income before depreciation (13).
ROE Income before extraordinary items for common shareholders (237) /
average book equity.
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